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Federal Taxation
by Dustin M. Covello*
and Augustus N. Makris**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the limited number of significant federal tax cases
decided by courts in the Eleventh Circuit in 2009.1 In Commissioner v.
Neal,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
became the first circuit court of appeals to examine whether the United
States Tax Court was required to conduct a trial de novo when a
taxpayer appealed the Internal Revenue Service's denial of relief under
I.R.C. § 6015.' In Nero Trading, LLC v. United States,4 the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the nature of the hearing a district court must provide
to a taxpayer who challenges a summons from the Service before the
district court may enforce such a summons.5 In United States v. UBS
AG, 6 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied a motion by the Swiss bank UBS AG in the ongoing
controversy surrounding the United States government's efforts to force
the bank to release the names of account holders suspected of tax
evasion.7 In United States v. Klohn, the United States District Court
* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Montclair State
University (B.A., 2005); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., 2008).
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Michigan (B.A., 2003); University of Chicago Law School (J.D., 2006). This Article does not
represent the views of King & Spalding LLP but solely reflects the views of its Authors.
1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit federal taxation law during the prior survey period,
see Dustin M. Covello, Jacquelyn L. Griffin & Svetoslav S. Minkov, Federal Taxation, 2008
Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1235 (2009).
2. 557 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2009).
3. I.R.C. § 6015 (2006); see Neal, 557 F.3d 1263.
4. 570 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009).
5. Id. at 1245.
6. No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009).
7. Id. at *1-2.
8. No. 3:06-cv-222-J-TEM, 2009 WL 536520 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2009).
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for the Middle District of Florida addressed the period within which a
taxpayer may claim a credit or refund of an overpayment of tax.9 The
case of In re Willis10 involved whether an individual's actions with
respect to his individual retirement accounts (IRAs) disqualified the
IRAs from bankruptcy exemption."
II.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT CASES

A.

Commissioner v. Neal
In Commissioner v. Neal,'2 the Eleventh Circuit considered the
following question: When a taxpayer appeals a decision by the Service
to deny that taxpayer equitable relief under I.R.C. § 6015(f), 13 must the

Tax Court conduct a trial de novo, or is it limited to considering only the
evidence included in the administrative record developed during the
Service's examination? 4 Neal involved a spousal conflict between
Alimam and Ruth Neal. The Neals kept their finances largely separate;
they had separate checking accounts, and they did not often discuss
their financial affairs with each other. Ruth and Alimam each paid half
of their monthly mortgage payment, Ruth paid most of the family's
expenses, and Alimam paid the housekeeper, utility bills, and car
payments. Despite Ruth's requests, Alimam refused to answer her
questions about the financial aspects of his business or allow her to
participate in the filing of the couple's joint federal income tax returns. 5 She gave her W-2 forms to Alimam, and Alimam's accountant
at the completed tax returns
prepared the returns. Ruth never looked
6
and never spoke to the accountant.1
As it turned out, Alimam had not paid taxes attributable to his
income. Though income taxes had been withheld from Ruth's own
salary, none of the taxes attributable to Alimam's business were paid.
Ruth finally learned that the couple owed taxes when she and her
husband sought bankruptcy protection in 1989. The bankruptcy
hearings revealed that Alimam had secretly purchased a boat, a
Colorado villa, at least six cars, and expensive fine art. After an audit

9. Id. at *5-6.
10. No. 07-11010-BKC-PGH, 2009 WL 2424548 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2009), affd
sub nom. Willis v. Menotte, No. 09-82303-CIV, 2010 WL 1408343 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2010).
11. Id. at *1.
12. 557 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2009).
13. I.R.C. § 6015(f) (2006).
14. See Neal, 557 F.3d at 1263.
15. Id. at 1265-66.
16. Id. at 1266.
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of the couple's 1990, 1991, and 1992 returns, a second declaration of
bankruptcy in 1995, and a second garnishment of her wages in 1996,
Ruth began to investigate the reasons underlying the couple's financial
problems. She eventually discovered that Alimam had been supporting
another woman who bore his child and that his share of the tax liability
was channeled to his secret life and the support of his second family.17
The couple divorced in 1998, and the divorce court ordered Alimam to
"pay all past and future tax liabilities incurred by the couple during
their marriage.""8 He failed to do so. The Service turned to Ruth,
seeking to collect the unpaid tax liabilities from her. The total amount
in controversy, exclusive of interest and penalties, was $278,996.19
Since 1938 the tax law has provided that spouses who file joint
returns are generally jointly and severally liable for the taxes associated
with the returns.2" In 1961, when the United States Supreme Court
held that embezzled funds constitute income,21 the Service began
holding the spouses of insolvent embezzlers jointly and severally liable
for the taxes associated with the embezzler's ill-gotten gains.22 The
Service continued to hold this position even in circumstances in which
the non-offending spouse was unaware of and did not benefit from the
embezzled funds.23
In 1971 Congress, dissatisfied with this result, enacted I.R.C.
§ 6013(e).24 This exception relieved an innocent spouse from joint and
several liability when (1) an understatement was due to the other
spouse's fraud, (2) the innocent spouse did not know and had no reason
to know of the understatement, and (3) it was inequitable in light of all
the facts and circumstances (particularly whether the innocent spouse
benefitted from the other spouse's concealed income) to hold the innocent

17. Id. at 1266-67.
18. Id. at 1267.
19. Id. at 1263.
20. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2006)).
21. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961).
22. See Scudder v. United States, 410 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir. 1969); Davenport v.
Comm'r, 48 T.C. 921, 926-27 (1967).
23. See, eg., Huelsman v. Comm'r, 416 F.2d 477, 478, 481 (6th Cir. 1969) (reversing
and remanding the Tax Court's decision that a wife was liable for her husband's income
tax deficiencies when the wife was unaware that her husband had embezzled money); Horn
v. Comm'r, 387 F.2d 621, 622 (5th Cir. 1967) (affirming the Tax Court's holding that a wife
who had no knowledge of her husband's embezzlement was nevertheless liable for her
husband's tax obligations).
24. See Innocent Spouse Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063.
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spouse liable for the other spouse's tax liability." In 1998 Congress
decided that these requirements were overly technical.26 Therefore,
Congress enacted I.R.C. § 6015(f).27 Section 6015(f) authorizes the
Service to grant equitable relief to a taxpayer if it would be inequitable
to hold that taxpayer liable for any unpaid tax and relief would not
otherwise be available under § 6015.28 If the Service denies equitable
relief, I.R.C. § 6015(e) 29 allows the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court
to determine the appropriate relief. "°
Ruth followed this course. Pursuant to § 6015(f), Ruth petitioned the
Service for equitable relief from joint and several liability for the portion
of the couple's tax attributable to Alimam's unpaid income tax. Her
petition was denied by an examining agent the following year. An
appeal to the IRS Office of Appeals was also unsuccessful. In 2003 the
Office echoed the examining agent's conclusions and denied her request
for equitable relief.3"
Ruth then petitioned the Tax Court pursuant to I.R.C. § 6015(e). In
her Tax Court case, Ruth sought to introduce new evidence concerning
the degree of economic hardship she would suffer if she paid the tax.
The Service argued that this evidence was inadmissible because the Tax
Court's review was limited to the administrative record.32 The Tax
Court held for Ruth, stating that its "review and determination was not

25. Id. Section 6013(e) was the predecessor to current I.R.C. § 6015(b). See I.R.C.
§ 6015(b) (2006).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) ("The Committee is concerned
that the innocent spouse provisions of present law are inadequate. The Committee believes
itis inappropriate to limit innocent spouse relief only to [cases that met section 6015(b) as
it then existed].").
27. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, § 3201(a), 112 Stat. 685, 739 (codified at I.R.C. § 6015(0 (2006)).
28. I.R.C. § 6015(f). Specifically, relief must not be available under either § 6015(b) or
§ 6015(c). Id. The parties in Neal agreed that relief was not available to Ruth under
either of those sections. 557 F.3d at 1265.
29. I.R.C. § 6015(e) (2006).
30. Id.
31. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1267. The examining agent had denied relief to Ruth on the
grounds that she knew the taxes on her joint returns had been underpaid when she signed
the returns, she would not suffer economic hardship if required to pay back taxes, and
because Ruth was responsible for a portion of the unpaid taxes. Id. The Office of Appeals
found that Ruth knew about the underpayment of taxes on her joint returns because the
Service had been involved in the couple's prior bankruptcy actions and in Ruth's wage
garnishments. Id. The Office also found that denying Ruth equitable relief would not
cause her to suffer economic hardship because the salary and child support payments she
received indicated that she "enjoy[ed] an upper middle income standard of living." Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. at 1267-68.
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limited to the administrative record but was de novo."33 Therefore, the
Tax Court allowed the parties to introduce testimony and other evidence
from outside of the administrative record. To prevail in a trial de novo,
the Service had abused its discretion in denying
Ruth had to show that
4
her equitable relief.

Ruth made that showing. After hearing the evidence, the Tax Court
found that she did not have knowledge of the unpaid taxes, that the
facts were inconclusive as to whether she would suffer economic
hardship if she were denied relief, and that, taking into account all the
facts and circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold her liable for the
tax.35
The Service timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the
Tax Court had erred in conducting a trial de novo. The Service
contended that the Tax Court was confined to considering only the
evidence contained in the administrative record.36
The Tax Court had considered this issue twice before. In 2004 in
Ewing v. Commissioner,3 7 the Tax Court held that it could conduct a
trial de novo when reviewing a denial of equitable relief.38 Four years
later,
the Tax Court reaffirmed that holding in Porter v. Commission9
3

er.

The Neal case, however, presented this question to a United States
court of appeals for the first time. The court began by analyzing the Tax
Court's reasoning in Ewing and Porter. It noted that in those cases, the
Tax Court focused on the statutory language in § 6015(e) and § 6015(f).4o Section 6015(e) permits the taxpayer to "petition the Tax Court
...to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual."4 1
The Court reiterated the conclusion in Ewing that a de novo review
"gives effect to the congressional mandate.., that we determinewhether
a taxpayer is entitled to relief under section 6015. "42 The court then
turned to the Tax Court's reasoning in Porter that reviews of § 6015(e)
petitions should be conducted de novo because § 6015(e) uses language

33.

Id. at 1268 (emphasis omitted).

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1268-70.
37. 122 T.C. 32 (2004), rev'd on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006).
38. Id. at 40-41.
39. 130 T.C. 115, 122-23 (2008).
40. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1270.
41. I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A).
42. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1270 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Ewing, 122 T.C. at 43).
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similar to that in I.R.C. § 62134' and I.R.C. § 6214, 44 and the Tax
Court has long reviewed petitions under those sections de novo.45
The court noted that there are other situations in which de novo
determinations are appropriate. For example, under I.R.C. § 7436(a),4 s
the Tax Court can "determine" whether the Service correctly determined
an individual's employment status.47 Section 640448 additionally
authorizes the Tax Court to "determine" whether the Service has abused
its discretion when it has refused to abate interest.49 In both instances,
the Tax Court's practice has been to make its determination de novo.5 °
Accordingly, the court held that when the Tax Court is asked to make
a "determination," as it is under § 6015(f), de novo review is appropriate.5 1

The court then turned its attention to the Service's argument that the52
record rule of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)
generally limits a court's review of an agency decision to the administrative record. 3 The court noted, however, that by its own terms the APA
does not limit or repeal other requirements imposed by statute or
otherwise recognized by law.14 The predecessors to the Tax Court had
a well-established practice of conducting determinations and redeterminations de novo in deficiency determinations prior to the enactment of
the APA in 1946." According to the court, the fact that § 6015(e) was
enacted in 1998, well after the passage of the APA, was irrelevant
because § 6015 is "part and parcel" of the statutory framework that
permitted de novo review of deficiency determinations in the pre-APA
era. " Accordingly, the record rule did not apply. 7
Moreover, the court endorsed the Tax Court's argument in Ewing and
Porter that confining appeals in equitable relief cases to a review of the
administrative record would result in inconsistent levels of review for

43. I.R.C. § 6213 (2006).
44. I.R.C. § 6214 (2006).
45. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1271 (citing Porter,130 T.C. at 119).
46. I.R.C. § 7436(a) (2006).
47. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1270-71 (citing I.R.C. § 7436(a)).
48. I.R.C. § 6404 (2006).
49. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1271 (citing I.R.C. § 6404).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006).
53. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1273; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
54. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1273.
55. Id. (citing Porter, 130 T.C. at 121-22; Ewing, 122 T.C. at 52 (Thornton, J.,
concurring)).
56. Id. at 1273.
57. Id. at 1273-74.
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similar cases.5" The Tax Court provided three examples of equitable
relief cases in which a trial de novo is held.5 9 First, if the Service fails
to consider an equitable relief petition under section 6015(f) within six
months, a taxpayer may petition the Tax Court, in which case the Tax
Court conducts a trial de novo.6 ° Likewise, in deficiency cases, the Tax
Court holds a trial de novo if a taxpayer raises equitable spouse relief as
an affirmative defense.61 In both of these cases, the Tax Court necessarily conducts a trial de novo because there is no administrative
Similarly, after a taxpayer petitions the Tax Court for
record."
equitable relief, § 6015(e) explicitly gives that taxpayer's spouse the
The Eleventh
right to intervene and become a party to the case.'
Circuit noted the Tax Court's reasoning in Ewing and Porter that such
a right to intervene suggests that Congress intended the Tax Court to
conduct trials de novo to allow intervening spouses to offer evidence to
challenge the taxpayer's entitlement to equitable relief.6 4 The court
indicated that it would be inconsistent to conduct de novo trials in these
situations but not to do so in Ruth's case.65
Finally, the court addressed the Service's argument that Robinette v.
Commissioner66 limited the Tax Court's review to the evidence in the
administrative record.67 Before the Service can levy a taxpayer's
property to satisfy unpaid taxes, I.R.C. § 633068 provides the taxpayer
with the right to a hearing with the IRS Office of Appeals and the right
to appeal the outcome of that hearing to the Tax Court.S In Robinette
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
Tax Court's review in such cases was limited to the evidence in the
administrative record.7 ° But the court in Neal reasoned that § 6330
provides the right to an "appeal," while § 6015 authorizes the Tax Court
to "determine" the appropriate relief.71 According to the court, "this

58. Id. at 1272.
59. See id.
60. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1273 (citing I.R.C. § 6015(e)(4); Porter, 130 T.C. at 125); Ewing, 122 T.C. at
42-43.
64. Id. (citing Porter, 130 T.C. at 125; Ewing, 122 T.C. at 43).
65. See id. (noting that identical issues should be treated similarly when heard by a
single tribunal).
66. 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).
67. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1275-76 (citing Robinette, 439 F.3d at 461).
68. I.R.C. § 6330 (2006).
69. Id.
70. 439 F.3d at 460, 464.
71. Neal, 557 F.3d at 1276.
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showed that Congress knew how to use the term 'appeal' and that
Congress meant something different when it authorized the Tax Court
in § 6015(e) 'to determine the appropriate relief available' to a taxpayer." 2 Accordingly, the court determined that Robinette was in fact
consistent with its reading of § 6015."3 For these reasons, the court
held that the Service had not shown that the Tax Court erred by
conducting a trial de novo.74
The court then addressed the Service's alternative contention that the
Tax Court still erred in finding, even under de novo review, that the
75
Service had abused its discretion when it denied Ruth equitable relief.
The court noted that "Section 6015(f) expressly authorizes the Commissioner to prescribe procedures for determining qualification for equitable
relief."7 6 Relief is generally granted if (1) the couple is divorced or
separated, (2) the spouse seeking relief did not know and had no reason
to know of the underpayment of taxes, and (3) the spouse will suffer
economic hardship if relief is not granted.7 7 Various additional factors
can be considered, including whether the spouse seeking relief has
suffered abuse at the hands of the non-requesting spouse and whether
the liability for taxes is attributable solely to the non-requesting
spouse.78 The court considered these factors as they related to Ruth's
situation and concluded that the Tax Court
had not abused its discretion
79
in providing her with equitable relief.
A substantial dissent was offered by Judge Tjoflat.80 He principally
argued that the majority's decision "supplant[ed] the scope and standard
of review set forth in the [APAI" and that the plain language of § 6015(f)
and the Tax Court's past actions relating to the provision did not
support the majority's conclusion."1 Accordingly, he argued that the
Tax Court's judgment should have been vacated and remanded, and he
would have instructed the Tax Court to limit its review to the administrative record. 2

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 6015(e)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447, at § 4.03).
Id. at 1276 n.19.
Id. at 1278.
Id. (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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Judge Tjoflat argued that the Code does not exclusively reference de
novo review when it uses the word determine.' For example, according
to Congress's explicit limitation, the Tax Court limits its review to the
administrative record when declaring retirement benefits despite the
prevalence of the word determination in that section's legislative
history." Further, in sections on personal holding company taxes,
deficiency dividends, and mitigation of tax returns, Congress does not
specify the use of de novo review and defines the word determination as
a "'decision by the Tax Court ...which has become final. ' "85 For these
reasons, Judge Tjoflat argued that the taxpayer's right to petition the
pursuant to § 6015(e)(1)(A)
Tax Court to "determine" appropriate relief
86
does not imply a right to de novo review.
Judge Tjoflat also took issue with the majority's interpretation of the
APA and its relation to the historical practices of the Tax Court.8 7 He
wrote, "It is a fundamental tenet of administrative law that a court is
'ordinarily limited to consideration of the decision of the agency ...and
of the evidence on which it was based.'"" He recognized that it is true
"that the enactment of the APA did not 'limit or repeal additional
requirements' of administrative procedure authorized by statute or by
common law."8 9 He also generally recognized that certain of the Tax
Court's trial de novo procedures for reviewing deficiency determinations
by the Service were well-established before the enactment of the APA,
and therefore, the Tax Court was not subject to the APA in certain
respects. 90
It was not clear to Judge Tjoflat, however, that § 6015 was "part and
parcel" of the procedures for reviewing deficiency determinations by the
Service in the pre-APA era. 91 Judge Tjoflat argued that because § 6015
was enacted well after the APA, a petitioner is not exempt from the

83. Id. at 1280.
84. Id. at 1280-81.
85. Id. at 1280 (quoting I.R.C. § 547(c) (2006); I.R.C. § 860(e) (2006); I.R.C. § 1313(a)
(2006)).
86. Id. at 1281.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 1278-79 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Vianchi, 373 U.S.
709, 714-15 (1963)). Judge Tjoflat argued that de novo review of adjudicative decision is
permitted only in those situations in which the agency uses inadequate factfinding
procedures. Id. at 1279. Because Ruth had the opportunity to provide information to the
examining agent and discuss her claim with that agent, Judge Tjoflat argued that the
procedures provided to her were sufficient. Id.
89. Id. at 1281 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 150
(1999)).
90. Id. at 1283.
91. See id. at 1285.
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APA's requirements unless he or she shows that an exemption exists
according to the text of the statute and the statute's legislative
history.92 He did not think Ruth had made that showing.93 He wrote:
I do not deny the possibility that Congress may have intended that the
Tax Court continue reviewing all matters in which it is granted
jurisdiction using an abuse of discretion standard and de novo scope of
review. But, a mere possibility is not sufficient to overwhelm Congressional interest in preserving uniformity and fairness in administrative
procedure. 9'
Judge Tjoflat also said that it was not problematic to apply a different
standard of review in different types of equitable relief cases.9" In
cases such as Neal, there is a well-developed administrative record,
whereas in the other types of equitable relief cases noted by the
majority, no sufficient administrative record exists.96 Last, Judge
Tjoflat argued that allowing a trial de novo increases the risk that the
Service, no longer the final arbiter of the facts, will not conduct an
impartial review and develop an impartial administrative record.97
One commentator has argued that the majority's position is consistent
with Congress's intent in enacting § 6015(f)-namely, to effectively grant
equitable relief, judges must be allowed to consider all the facts in a
given case.9" Nevertheless, the Service has not abandoned its litigating
position, 99 and it is therefore likely that appellate courts will continue
to examine this issue.
Nero Trading, LLC v. United States
In Nero Trading, LLC v. United States, 00° the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the nature of the hearing a district court must provide to a
taxpayer who challenges a summons from the Service before the district

B.

92. Id. at 1284.

93. See id.
94. Id. at 1286.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1286-87.
98. See A. Lavar Taylor, New Administrative Procedures Affecting Section 6015(t)
Innocent Spouse Claimants:A Safety Valve to Protect the Rights of Claimantsin the Event
the Tax Court'sHolding in Porter v. Commissioner Is Overruled, CAL. TAX LAW., Summer
2009, at 43, 47, available at httpJ/www/taylorlaw.com/pdf/6015-article.pdf.
99. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Notice CC-2009-021 (June 30, 2009) (advising Chief
Counsel attorneys to continue to assert the Service's position from Ewing and Porter),
availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc-2009-021.pdf.
100. 570 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009).
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court may enforce such a summons. °10 The Nero case involved a
consolidated appeal brought by two taxpayers-Nero Trading, LLC and
Ironwood Trading, LLC. The Service issued Nero and Ironwood
administrative summonses requesting information regarding the legal
and tax advice obtained by each taxpayer in relation to distressed asset
and debt (DAD) transactions in which each taxpayer had participated.
The Service was concerned that each taxpayer had benefitted from a
DAD transaction involving the use of distressed assets to acquire
economic losses from tax-indifferent parties. Both taxpayers filed
motions to quash the summonses. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia denied Nero's motion without a hearing.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
denied Ironwood's motion after a limited evidentiary hearing in which
it was able to question the Service agent that issued the summons.' °2
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code °3 grants the Service
broad authority to issue a summons to ascertain the correctness of any
return, determine a taxpayer's tax liability, or collect tax, among other
things." 4 A Service summons is not self-executing, however, so the
summons can only be enforced if the Service applies to the appropriate
district court.' 5 To enforce such a summons, the Service must make
a prima facie showing that (1) the Service will conduct its investigation
for a legitimate purpose, (2) the Service's inquiry may be relevant to that
purpose, (3) the Service does not already possess the information sought,
and (4) the Service has followed the administrative steps necessary
under the Code. 0 6 If the Service makes this prima facie case, "'the
burden shifts to the party contesting the summons to disprove one of the
four elements of the government's prima facie showing or convince the
court that enforcement of the summons would constitute an abuse of the
court's process.'"1" 7 In Nero the Eleventh Circuit decided what types
of procedures a taxpayer is entitled to use to meet that burden.'0 8
In the Eleventh Circuit, a taxpayer is allowed a limited adversarial
hearing at which he can learn whether the Service issued a summons for

101. Id. at 1245.
102. Id. at 1245-46.
103. I.R.C. § 7602 (2006).
104. Id.
105. Nero, 570 F.3d at 1248 (citing I.R.C. § 7604(b) (2006)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1249 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130,
1132 (11th Cir. 2008)).
108. See id.
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an improper purpose." 9 To obtain the hearing, the taxpayer need only
allege improper purpose.110 A hearing is necessary to provide the
taxpayer the chance to learn the facts necessary to quash an improperly
issued summons.'
The district court may generally use its discretion
in determining the scope of the hearing, but an allegation of improper
purpose alone does not enable the parties to use discovery devices such
as depositions and interrogatories." 2
The district court denied Nero's motion to quash the summons without
granting Nero a limited adversarial hearing and without articulating its
reasons for forgoing such a hearing."3 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the district court abused its discretion and reversed and
remanded accordingly."'
In Ironwood's case, however, the district
court granted a limited adversarial hearing in which it permitted
Ironwood to subpoena and question the agent who issued the summons."' The Eleventh Circuit held that this procedure constituted a
sufficient hearing." 6
III.
A.

DISTRICT COURT CASES

United States v. UBS AG

The tax case in the Eleventh Circuit that received more media
attention than any other did not actually involve any significant United7
States federal tax law issue. The case of United States v. UBS AG"
arose from the efforts of the United States government to force Swiss
bank UBS to release the names of foreign accounts tied to United States
citizens suspected of tax evasion." 8
The Service petitioned the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida to compel UBS to produce records relating
to United States taxpayers who from 2002 to 2007 had accounts
maintained, monitored, or managed by UBS. UBS did not have W-9

109. Id. Other circuit courts require a taxpayer to develop facts sufficient to allow an
inference of wrongful conduct by the Service before granting an adversarial hearing. See,
eg., United States v. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc., 718 F.2d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1983); United States
v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 544 (7th Cir. 1981).
110. Nero, 570 F.3d at 1249.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1250.
114. See id. at 1250-51.
115. Id. at 1248.
116. See id. at 1250.
117. No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009).
118. Id. at *1.
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Forms executed by such taxpayers and did not file accurate and timely
1099 Forms naming and reporting all payments made to such taxpayers.
UBS contended that its obligation, if any, to disclose such records did not
extend to records already obtained by the Service through voluntary
disclosures and other filings. Accordingly, UBS filed a motion seeking
an order requiring the Service to disclose the accounts already identified
'
through alternate means by the Service. 19
The district court denied that motion."'2 The court wrote that
controlling caselaw in the Eleventh Circuit rejected the proposition that
a summons from the Service should not be enforced simply because the
Service is in possession of some of the records sought. 2 ' The court
noted that "'actual possession of or access to information by the IRS is
not an absolute bar to enforcement of a summons for that information. '"' 22 In any case, the court held that the Service should not be
deemed to be in possession of information contained in voluminous
corporate records.' 23 Because there was no alternative means of securing
the information sought by the Service's summons, the court denied
UBS's motion.124 The ongoing dispute involves many other facts and
'
legal and political issues beyond the scope of this Article. 25
B.

United States v. Klohn

'
the Service collected $27,218.68 in trust
In United States v. Klohn, 26
fund recovery penalties from Dieter Klohn in violation of the automatic
stay in Klohn's bankruptcy case.127 Klohn sought a refund. 121 Sec-

119. Id.
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id. at *l.
122. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. As of the writing of this Article, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court held that
UBS could not disclose to the Service the names of its clients because their actions did not
constitute "tax fraud and the like" under Swiss law. See Swiss Court Says Government
Cannot Disclose UBS Data on U.S. Clients, Tax Notes Today (Tax Analysts) 15-H (Jan. 25,
2010), available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 15-H.
126. No. 3:06-cv-222-J-TEM, 2009 WL 536520 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2009).
127. Id. at *3. The income and social security taxes an employer withholds from
employees are called "trust fund" taxes on the theory that those taxes are held in trust for
the government. M. Robyn Cotrona, The Price of Employees: Employment Tax Withholding
and the Trust Fund Penalty, 69 FLA. B.J. 27, 27 (1995). Under I.R.C. § 6672(a) (2006), a
"trust fund recovery penalty" is assessed against business owners who fail to timely pay
over these withheld taxes to the government. See id.
128. Klohn, 2009 WL 536520, at *2.
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' provides that a claim for
tion 6511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 29
a credit or refund of an overpayment of tax must be filed within the
later of three years from the time the relevant return was filed or two
years from the time the tax was paid, or if no return is filed, within two
years from the time the tax was paid.'3 ° The two-year statute of
limitations period applied to Klohn's refund claim because
no return was
131
filed with respect to the invalid tax liabilities at issue.
Klohn failed to claim a refund within the two-year period beginning
on the date of the overpayment. He argued, however, that the statute
of limitations did not start on the date of the overpayment, as the
Service contended, but the date on which the district court determined
the tax assessments were invalid.'32
33
The district court dismissed Klohn's argument as "imaginative."'
Section 6511(a) plainly states that the statute of limitations begins
running from the time the tax is "paid." '34 No reference is made to the
time at which the tax is deemed to be invalidly assessed.1 35 Further,
reasoned the court, its holding was supported by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)

(1),'13 which confers original jurisdiction upon federal district courts

to hear claims for taxes alleged to have been erroneously assessed or
collected.1 37 That statute does not require that a disputed tax liability
first be adjudicated as illegally assessed before a refund action may be
commenced. 3 ' For these reasons, the district court ruled against
39
Klohn and granted summary judgment in favor of the government.
C.

Steffen v. United States
In Steffen v. United States, 4 ' Terri Steffen and her husband, Paul
Bilzerian, were two of seven limited partners in a limited partnership
that owned all the stock of Bicoastal Acquisition Corporation. Bilzerian
and his company, Bicoastal Acquisition Corporation, were the general

129.

I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2006).

130. Id.
131. Klohn, 2009 WL 536520, at *4.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *5.
134. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6511(a)).
135. Id.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2006); Klohn, 2009 WL 536520, at *5.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2006).
138. See id.
139. Klohn, 2009 WL 536520, at *6.
140. No. 8:08-CVo2337-T-24 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009) (amended order affirming in part
and reversing in part bankruptcy court's decisions).
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partners of the partnership.1 4 1 The case came before the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida on an appeal of certain
orders from the bankruptcy court. The issues on appeal pertained to
Steffen's objection to the Service's $5856 claim in her personal bankruptcy case. Steffen objected to the Service's claim based on the Service's
treatment of three taxable events: (1) the worthlessness of Steffen's
money, and (3) the
Bicoastal stock, (2) the alleged theft of Steffen's
42
Bicoastal.'
by
her
to
owed
debt
a
of
vitality
The main issue on appeal was which year Steffen's Bicoastal stock
became worthless. In 1991 Steffen amended her 1989 tax return to
reflect her determination that the Bicoastal stock became worthless in
1989. In 1989 more than $500 million worth of claims had been filed
against Bicoastal, and Bicoastal was unable to pay some of those debts.
filed a voluntary petition seeking Chapter 11
As a result, Bicoastal
43
relief.'
bankruptcy
The Service denied the deduction.' 44 "A stock is worthless if it has
The
no present value and no reasonable prospect of future value."'
1993
in
Service contended that Steffen should have taken a deduction
because various events indicated that Steffen and Bilzerian believed that
the Bicoastal stock had potential future value until 1993. In 1990
Bilzerian indirectly transferred interests in Bicoastal to fully satisfy $7.5
million of debt. In 1991 he caused an indirect interest in Bicoastal to be
pledged as collateral to obtain a $9.5 million loan. Bilzerian also told his
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee that the partnership, whose main asset
was the Bicoastal stock, had substantial value. In 1993 Steffen and
Bilzerian attempted to settle Bilzerian's bankruptcy claims by trying to
transfer a twenty-five percent interest in the partnership to the Chapter
7 trustee. Further, Bilzerian also refused to support Bicoastal's $92
million settlement of claims against a third party. Bilzerian objected to
the settlement because he believed the value of Bicoastal's claim was
significantly higher. Lastly, Steffen listed the Loving Spirit Foundation's interest in the partnership as an asset worth $595,830 on the
foundation's 1993 tax return.1 46 For these reasons, the bankruptcy
court found that the Bicoastal stock had not become worthless until

141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 1-2.
143. Id. at 2.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3 n.3.
146. Id. at 3.
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1993.147 On appeal, the district court held that the factual findings of
the bankruptcy court were not clearly erroneous.'
The next issue the court addressed was whether Steffen was entitled
Steffen claimed the deduction
to take a theft loss deduction in 1991.'
because an interior designer was paid for services that the designer
never provided. The Service argued that Steffen did not show that the
loss occurred, and, if the loss had occurred, it belonged to Bicoastal.15 °
After an examination of the evidence, the bankruptcy court held that
Steffen had not proved that the loss occurred and, if it had, the loss
To take a theft loss deduction, a
belonged to Bicoastal, not Steffen.'
taxpayer must prove that there is no reasonable prospect of recovery. 5 2 In 1991, however, Steffen pursued recovery from her interior
designer in a bankruptcy action. The bankruptcy court found that
Steffen, therefore, believed that she had a reasonable prospect of
recovery against her interior designer in 1991. There was little other
evidence presented on the issue.'
In any case, the bankruptcy court found that the loss, if any, belonged
to Bicoastal because Bicoastal paid the vast majority of the interior
designer's fee. Further, the interior designer invoiced Bicoastal, not
Steffen. Thus, the bankruptcy court disallowed Steffen's theft loss

deduction.15
Upon a motion to reconsider submitted by Steffen, however, the
bankruptcy court reversed its initial holding based on factual findings
in a different case to which the Service was not a party. It was not clear
what factual findings were presented in that other case. 5 ' The district
court was "troubled" by the bankruptcy court's reversal "based only on
findings it made in a different case to which the [Service] was not a
Accordingly, the district court reversed and held that the
party."'
bankruptcy court's initial decision disallowing the theft57loss must stand
based on the reasons contained in the initial decision.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1977).
Steffen, No. 8:08-CV-02337-T-24, slip op. at 13-14.
Id. at 12-14.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 14.
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The final issue was whether Steffen was entitled to take a bad debt
deduction in 1993. 58'
Steffen based the deduction on money she
allegedly loaned to Bicoastal that was never repaid. The Service
asserted that Steffen did not prove that a business debt actually existed.
Steffen disagreed, noting that an earlier decision of the bankruptcy court
had found Steffen's claim against Bicoastal to be valid. The bankruptcy
court agreed with Steffen.' s9
Section 166(a)"8 of the Internal Revenue Code provides "[there shall
be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the
taxable year."' 61 It was undisputed that in 1993 the entire amount of
the alleged debt was set off against amounts owed to Bicoastal. Thus,
the Service asserted that the debt was not worthless.162 The district
court agreed and reversed accordingly.'6
D. In re Willis
In In re Willis,16 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Florida addressed whether funds held in Ernest W.
Willis's IRAs were exempt from his bankruptcy estate. 6 ' Willis and
his wife owned fifty percent of a corporation whose sole tangible asset
was an improved parcel of real estate in Boca Raton, Florida. By 1993
the corporation was delinquent on its mortgage payments. Willis and
the bank holding the mortgage entered into a settlement agreement
under which the bank would assign the mortgage to Willis for $792,500.
To finance the purchase of the assignment, Willis authorized a $700,000
wire transfer from an IRA that he held with Merrill Lynch.' 66 In
December 1993 the money was transferred to the bank's escrow agent,
and the bank "executed an assignment of mortgage naming Willis as the
assignee.
Willis borrowed funds from others so he could repay
$700,000 to his Merrill Lynch IRA. In February 1994 Willis deposited
$700,000 into the Merrill Lynch IRA. 6 '

158. Id. at 4.
159. Id. at 15.
160. I.R.C. § 166(a) (2006).
161. Id.
162. Steffen, No. 8:08-CV-02337-T-24, slip op. at 16.
163. Id.
164. In re Willis, No. 07-11010-BKC-PGH, 2009 WL 2424548 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 9,
2009), affd sub nom. Willis v. Menotte, No. 09-82303-CIV, 2010 WL 1408343 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 6, 2010).
165. See id. at *1.
166. Id. at *1-2.
167. Id. at *2.
168. Id.
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Willis also had a brokerage account with Mercury Finance Securities.
In January 1997 the balance in that brokerage account was negative
$112,395. To cover the losses, Willis engaged in a check-swapping
process between the brokerage account and the Merrill Lynch IRA.' 9
The check-swapping process resulted in total deposits of $2,022,000 into
the brokerage account and total deposits of $1,835,500 into the Merrill
created a positive
Lynch IRA during 1997 and 1998. These transactions
70
balance of $186,500 in the brokerage account.'
Willis also transferred funds from the Merrill Lynch IRA to two other
IRAs. Between August and November of 2002, Willis transferred
$60,000 from the Merrill Lynch IRA to an IRA with Fidelity bank. 7 '
In addition, in June of 2002, Willis withdrew $90,000 from the Merrill
Lynch IRA. Those funds were deposited to and withdrawn from various
accounts over the course of the ensuing four-and-a-half years until they
landed in an IRA handled by AmTrust bank, along with some other
funds.7 In December 2006 Willis contributed $108,433.60 to the AmTrust
IRA.1 2
In February 2007 Willis filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. He
claimed exemptions for the Merrill Lynch IRA, the AmTrust Bank IRA,
and the Fidelity IRA. The IRAs were valued at $1,247,000, $109,000,
The bankruptcy trustee and Willis's
and $143,000, respectively.
creditors (the movants)
objected
to Willis's claimed exemptions, and a
1 73
lawsuit ensued.
7
provides that when
Section 522(b)(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code'1
the IRS issues a "favorable determination" with respect to an IRA's
structure and form, the retirement funds held in the IRA are presumed
It was undisputed that
to be exempt from the bankruptcy estate. 7
the IRS had issued a favorable determination with respect to each IRA
funds held by
at issue, so the movants had the burden of proving that
7 6
the IRAs were not exempt from the bankruptcy estate.'

169. Id. Willis deposited funds to his brokerage account that he borrowed from the
Merrill Lynch IRA. Id. Within sixty days, Willis borrowed additional funds from the
Merrill Lynch IRA, deposited those funds in his brokerage account, then withdrew funds
on the same day from his brokerage account to pay off the prior loan from the Merrill
Lynch IRA. Id. at *14 n.2. He repeated this process every sixty days. Id.
170. Id. at *3.
171. Id. at *3-4.
172. Id. at *11.
173. Id. at *1.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A) (2006).
175. Id.
176. See In re Willis, 2009 WL 2424548, at *7, *11. Willis argued that section
522(b)(4)(A) created an irrebuttable presumption. Id. at *6. The court held that the
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The movants pointed to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C)."' That statute
provides that an individual debtor may exempt from property of the
bankruptcy estate "retirement funds to the extent those funds are" held
in an IRA that is exempt from tax under I.R.C. § 408.178 Section
408(e) of the Internal Revenue Code states that an IRA will not be
exempt from tax as of the first day of the taxable year in which the
"individual for whose benefit [the IRA] is established ...engages in any
'transaction prohibited' under section 4975 with respect to [the
IRA]."179 Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code,' 80 in relevant
part, defines prohibited transactionas any direct or indirect (1) "lending
of money or other extension of credit between [an account] and a
disqualified person" or (2) "transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a
disqualified person of the income or assets of [the account]."18'
Generally, a "disqualified person" is any person who exercises
82
discretionary authority or control over the assets of the account.
The court concluded that Willis exercised discretionary authority and
control over the IRAs and that he was therefore a disqualified person
with respect to each account. 1"
Willis transferred $700,000 from the Merrill Lynch IRA to purchase
8 4
It was for the benefit of
the mortgage on real estate in Boca Raton."
85
Willis because he subsequently sold the property for $1.2 million.1
The fact that Willis had repaid the $700,000 made no difference because
extensions of credit are also prohibited transactions."' Accordingly,
the court held that the transactions constituted prohibited transactions. ' 7 As a result, the Merrill Lynch IRA ceased to be qualified
under § 408 as of January 1, 1993.'8' Thus, the court held that the

presumption was rebuttable because bankruptcy courts generally interpreted the word
"presumed" to create a rebuttable presumption under the Bankruptcy Code and because
Congress would have omitted the words "presumed to be" from the statute if the
presumption was not intended to be rebuttable. Id. at *6-7.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C) (2006); see In re Willis, 2009 WL 2424548, at *8.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C); I.R.C. § 408 (2006).
179. I.R.C. § 408(e).
180. I.R.C. § 4975 (2006).
181. Id. § (c)(1).
182. In re Willis, 2009 WL 2424548, at *9 (citing I.R.C. § 4975(e)(3)(A)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at *9.
185. Id.
186. See id. at *9-10.
187. Id. at *9.
188. Id. The court also found that the check-swapping process constituted a prohibited
transaction. Id. at *10-11. The series of transactions had the effect of providing an
extension of credit between the Merrill Lynch IRA and Willis. Id. at *10. Consequently,
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funds in the Merrill Lynch IRA were not exempt from the bankruptcy
estate.'8 9
The court also held that the funds in the AmTrust IRA and the
Fidelity IRA were not exempt from the bankruptcy estate.' 90 "IRA
funds rolled over from a non-qualified account retain their non-qualified
status."1 9' However, the funds in the AmTrust IRA and the Fidelity
IRA were rolled over from the Merrill Lynch IRA after it ceased to be
exempt as a result of Willis's prohibited transactions. 92 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the funds in the AmTrust IRA and the Fidelity
IRA were not exempt from the bankruptcy estate. 193 The court
likewise held that distributions from the Merrill Lynch IRA were not
exempt from Willis's bankruptcy estate.' 94 Although distributions from
an IRA that are deposited to another IRA within sixty days are generally
exempt from a debtor's bankruptcy estate, Willis's distributions from the
Merrill Lynch IRA were not exempt at the time that he took such
distributions because the Merrill Lynch IRA was disqualified at that
time.198

the court held that had the Merrill Lynch IRA not already ceased to be exempt in 1993,
these prohibited transactions would have destroyed its tax-exempt status as of January 1,
1997. Id.
189. Id. at *9-11.
190. Id. at *11-12.
191. Id. at *11.
192. Id. at *11-12.
193. Id. The funds in the Fidelity IRA were included in the bankruptcy estate only to
the extent of the $60,000 that could be traced to the Merrill Lynch IRA. Id. at *12. The
Fidelity IRA contained funds from other sources, and the source of those other funds was
not clear. Id. at *14 n.6. Thus, the court held that the movants failed to present rebuttal
evidence to establish that those other funds did not qualify for exemption from the
bankruptcy estate. Id.
194. Id. at "13.
195. Id.

